Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent

my comments be placed in the record. I apologize to the witnesses

for being tied up. I am anxious to hear and ask questions, but

thank you.

Today, the Foreign Relations Committee examines the future of U.S. policy toward

North Korea. This hearing is particularly timely, as the administration is in

the middle of its Korea policy review.

I am glad that President Bush is spending some time to make sure the administration

gets Korea policy right. It’s a new administration, and it is understandable

that they will need a few months to get their feet on the ground.

But I hope the administration will expeditiously complete its review and that it

will conclude, as I have, that the best way to advance our interests is to join with

our South Korean, Japanese, and European allies in a hard-headed strategy of engaging

North Korea and luring it out of its isolation.

Over the April recess, I asked a member of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee

to travel to Northeast Asia to explore the prospects for peace and reconciliation

on the Korean Peninsula. He was the first member of the United States Government

to travel officially to North Korea since President Bush was inaugurated.

In a report released today, he concludes that North Korea is engaged in a major

strategic opening to the outside world, and that this opening may afford the United

States a unique opportunity to rein-in the North’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

I urge the administration to test North Korea’s commitment to peace. Specifically,

I hope the administration will ‘‘pick up where the Clinton administration left off,’’

on missile talks, as Secretary Powell pledged prior to the arrival of South Korean

President Kim Dae-jung to Washington last March. North Korea earlier this month

unilaterally extended its missile launch moratorium until 2003.

If that is not a signal of its willingness to talk about this issue, I don’t know what

is.

Progress on the missile issue would have profound implications for U.S. security

interests not only on the Korean Peninsula, but around the world. If we were able

to curtail North Korea’s development and export of long-range missiles, we would

gain much-needed time and flexibility in our own deliberations on national missile

defenses.

President Bush has wondered aloud whether engaging North Korea is ‘‘naive,’’

and he has expressed his skepticism about North Korea as a negotiating partner.

Who can blame him?

One of our witnesses today—Chuck Downs—literally ‘‘wrote the book’’ about

North Korea’s truculent negotiating tactics, and another—Dean Gallucci—suffered

through months of meetings with ornery North Korean counterparts.

Ambassador Laney knows the difficult challenges of negotiating not only with

North Korea, but also with our South Korean allies!

I can’t speak for them, but I would wager that all of our witnesses would endorse

an approach to North Korea based on President Reagan’s famous maxim of ‘‘trust,

but verify.’’

In the case of North Korea, perhaps we should ‘‘mistrust, and verify.’’ But we

should also remember to keep our eye on the ball.

Advancing vital U.S. interests over time is the objective of engagement, not a *prerequisite*

for dialogue.

Some may argue that no verifiable deal is possible. There will always be those

who prefer inaction to action, and sometimes their pessimism is warranted.

But the nay-sayers argued that North Korea would never sign the Agreed Framework

and permit 24–7 International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring of its nuclear

facility at Yongbyon, never shut its reprocessing plant, never let U.S. military

personnel search for the remains of U.S. servicemen missing from the Korean War,

never permit inspections of a suspicious underground military facility, never approve

Chinese-style economic reforms, never permit monitoring of food aid deliveries,

and never permit travel across the DMZ from Seoul to Pyongyang.

And they were wrong on all counts.

So I think we should give it a try.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses and to getting

their advice on how the United States can best secure its vital national interests

on the Korean Peninsula.

We noticed, doctor, none of us are speaking German,

so you are not the stupid one.

Thank you very much. First of all, thank you for

being here, and Doctor, for your humanity and concern the fact

that you would give of your time and your effort as a medical doctor

to be in Korea or any other place where you are trying to

change the human condition is admirable, and I admire your work.

I admire what you are doing, and what you were doing.

Dean, let me ask you about the Agreed Framework for a moment.

Is there any case that can be made that the North Koreans

are violating the terms of the Agreed Framework?

Ambassador Laney, if I may ask you, if the North

Koreans—if we were to engage the North Koreans, this administration,

in follow on negotiations where things left off, if not under the

same conditions but just begin to engage North Koreans after this

review that Mr. Downs and others have spoken of, I assume at

some point the administration is going to say, we have reviewed,

we have made a judgment, and we are either not going to talk to,

we are going to talk to, we are going to talk to under following conditions,

whatever. They are going to say something at some point

in the relatively near term.

Assume they were to follow, after the review, the judgment initially

enunciated by Secretary Powell, and I am paraphrasing,

where Powell said there are some very promising possibilities—I

forget the exact phrase, but that is about it, some promising possibilities that are worth pursuing, and again I am paraphrasing. I

am not quoting him.

Assume they pursued, they, this administration, pursued after

review along the lines that Powell had stated a month ago, or

whenever the timeframe was, and focused on what was one of the

remaining issues, verification. That is, the verifiability of the North

Koreans that they (a) were not engaging in a continuation of seeking

long-range missile capability, (b) that they were not producing

fissile material to produce nuclear bombs, and (c) they were not

proliferating the technology they now possess to other countries

which they have in the past, and may be doing now, in return for

something. I want to get to the something later.

But the first thing would be, verifiability. I think any administration

hopefully would conclude that you would need a verifiable

agreement, whatever the terms were. Is verifiability able to be accomplished?

That is, is there any circumstance that you know of

that would make it virtually impossible for there to be a verifiable

agreement, or is it possible to have a verifiable agreement? Not will

they, but is it possible?

I was not suggesting there had to be perfect

verification. There are some, like my good friend the chairman of

the committee, and he is my good friend, who often quotes—I forget

who it is you quote, Mr. Chairman, when you say that whoever it

was said ‘‘we have never lost a war nor won a treaty,’’ and there

are those like the chairman who feel very strongly that there is

verification, and then there is verification, and we probably disagree

on the degree to which we have to verify whether we are

dealing with Russians or we are dealing with anyone. That is an

ongoing dispute.

But my time is up. I may come back to it, and I wanted to get

to you, Mr. Downs, about verification, not now because my time is

up. I will come back, but just to talk with me a little bit about

what you believe the parameters are, what is required for

verification and whether or not you think that it is worth attempting

to determine whether or not the North Koreans are prepared

to engage in such a dialog. I would be interested to know your

views, but again, please let me give you a heads-up and I will come

back to you on that.

Thank you very much.